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Formal and Informal Constitutional Amendment
Mortimer Newlin Stead Sellers

Abstract

The constitutional search for greater justice is the
animating principle that guides or should guide constitutional amendment and constitutional change whenever
and wherever it occurs. Almost all states and governments
formally declare their constitutional commitment to justice, liberty, and the rule of law. Yet reports on constitutional amendment from nations throughout the world
remind us that we live at a moment of constitutional
peril. The general trend of constitutional government in
many states has been towards greater corruption, violence,
and arbitrary action. This illustrates the dual and parallel
importance of constitutional principles and constitutional
structures in securing the rule of law. Constitutional
principles animate the constitutional structures that apply
our constitutional principles in practice. Constitutional
amendment and constitutional change can be formal,
informal, cultural, and even at times, illegal. Which
techniques are appropriate will vary according to the
circumstances. The failure of widely shared and welldeveloped
formal
or
structural
constitutional
arrangements to prevent the decline of the rule of law in
the early twenty-ﬁrst century conﬁrms the important role
that informal and cultural constitutional change have
always played in the development of constitutional justice.
While constitutions can declare the importance of liberty,
justice, and the public welfare, and establish constitutional
checks and balances to protect them, they cannot guarantee good faith. That depends on the lawyers, judges, and
scholars who make the constitution real.

This General Report will be also published, together with the National
Reports from each jurisdiction, by Springer Nature Switzerland in a
thematic volume.
M. N. S. Sellers (*)
University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, USA

Constitutional amendment is the process by which
constitutions change. The use of “amendment” in this context
signiﬁes the expectation that change will be for the better,
removing faults that mar the status quo.1 Such amendment
may be formal or informal, open or hidden, deeply considered or happened upon without much thought. What makes
an amendment legitimate and justiﬁed (or not) is its actual
effectiveness in making the constitution better, which is to
say in securing liberty and justice through law. This Report
reﬂects the insights of twenty authors from fourteen
jurisdictions, who considered how their nations and
constitutions use constitutional amendment to secure a more
just society for all those subject to their government and
laws—or fail to do so—by which methods, and with what
consequences.2
Every legal system has a constitution, by which I mean an
overall structure and guiding rules by which it operates. The
concept and reality of any legal system entails the existence of
such a governing constitution, and vice versa. Thus, when we
study legal systems, we seek to describe their constitutions
and when we seek to create or improve legal systems, we
seek to develop or amend these constitutions. Constitutions
may also change or evolve without the deliberate intervention
of any particular actor, but when deliberately made or
recognized we call the process of constitutional change
“amendment.” To “amend” a constitution is deliberately to
change or recognize a change in the guiding rules or overall
structure by which the legal system operates in practice.3
Constitutional amendment can be either formal or informal, just as constitutions themselves can be either formal or
informal. Formal constitutional amendment is amendment
according to the declared rules or announced structures of
From the Latin “emendare,” “to remove a fault.”
On Constitutional change in general see recently, Albert et al. (2017);
Contiades (2013).
3
For the development of modern constitutionalism see Adams (1788);
Cf. Montesquieu (1748).
1
2
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the system itself. Informal constitutional amendment is constitutional amendment by any other means, uncontemplated
by, unstated by, or contrary to the declared rules or
announced structures of the legal system being modiﬁed.
Sometimes the legal system has very few declared rules or
announced structure. Then constitutional amendment will
mostly be informal. Sometimes the existence or nonexistence
or the legitimacy or illegitimacy of declared rules and
structures of amendment governing a legal system remains
disputed. Then the formality or informality or existence or
legitimacy of constitutional amendments will also be subject
to dispute.
There may also be a gap between formally recognized and
informally effective methods of constitutional amendment.
The mere declaration or announcement of constitutional
structures or rules does not necessarily make them effective
in fact. Methods of amendment not declared or formally
accepted by the legal system may be more effective than
those that are formally announced. The nature of constitutional amendment and constitutional change, the methods by
which change takes place, and the circumstances in which
amendment or change is appropriate will all differ depending
on the legitimacy, effectiveness, justice, history, and other
contingencies of the existing constitution and institutions of
the legal system in question. Yet there are some unifying
themes, common aspirations, shared principles and vocabulary that emerge from the systematic study and comparison of
constitutional amendment and constitutional change as it
takes place in different jurisdictions. Comparisons also help
clarify which techniques are most useful in what
circumstances, and when they are not.

1

Constitutional Amendment

Identifying common themes and shared principles in the
project of constitutional government and the science of constitutional law requires consideration of the nature of the
enterprise. What is—or should be—the purpose of constitutional amendment? Explicit or implicit in all the national
reports on constitutional amendment and constitutional
change is the statement or assumption that the only legitimate
purpose of constitutional amendment is to improve the constitution in question, by making it more effective in achieving
its aims. Those proposing amendments or constitutional
change always also advance the necessary justifying assertion that the proposed alteration will make the constitution
better than it was before.
This makes the assumed purposes of constitutional
amendment and formal and informal constitutional change
dependent in turn on the purpose or purposes of constitutions
and constitutionalism in general. If the purpose of constitutional amendment is or should be to make constitutions

better, then there must be a standard against which
constitutions may be judged to be good or bad—and therefore to be better or worse and in need of amendment, or not.
Here too some shared basic assumptions pervade the reports:
constitutions are better when they establish justice through
the rule of law, and worse when they facilitate injustice or
oppression.
Understanding the nature and purpose of a practice (or a
document) makes the practice or institution easier to
improve. The value of comparative constitutional law arises
not only from the beneﬁts of learning about the practices of
others as a good in itself, but also from the insights such
comparisons bring to our own particular institutions and
laws. We see our own strengths and ﬂaws more clearly in
the light of comparison and receive guidance and inspiration
for how we might legislate, govern, and adjudicate better in
the future than we have in the past.

2

Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism is the desire to understand and deliberately
to improve the overall structure and guiding rules by which a
legal system operates. Every institution has a constitution,
whether its structure has been considered or reﬂected upon or
not. The constitution is simply those rules by which an
institution predictably operates, at any particular time. Such
rules need not be self-consciously maintained, or even understood to be a “constitution” in the most basic sense of that
word. But constitutionalism as a discipline goes further. It
subjects the existing form of government to scrutiny. “Constitutionalism” is the deliberate study of and search for improvement in the constitutional architecture of the State. The very
term “amendment” implies ameliorisation. Formal and informal constitutional amendment are the tools of constitutionalism and reﬂect the constitutionalists’ deliberate attempt to
implement necessary constitutional improvements by design.
All human societies and institutions have constitutions,
but as applied to “States”, “Commonwealths”, or
“Republics” the process becomes more considered. Constitutionalism develops as we seek to perfect our legal and political institutions, through deliberate constitutional change or
amendment. Since justice is the measure of political and
constitutional legitimacy, the only legitimate purpose of constitutional amendment is to make the constitution more just,
and all constitutional amendments implicitly claim to do
so. Constitutions and other political institutions are justiﬁed
only to the extent that are actually just, and therefore all
political and legal institutions tacitly or explicitly claim to
be just in reality.
The search for justice and the claim of justice that are at
the heart of the constitutional project need not be absolute or
fully successful to justify constitutional change or
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amendment. To be justiﬁed, the change must be at least a
little bit for the better and must at least somewhat advance
public institutions towards the ultimate and unachievable
goal of establishing a perfectly just republic. Constitutional
change can be legitimate or illegitimate, justiﬁed or unjustiﬁed, appropriate or not. The primary value and purpose of the
study of comparative constitutional law through the gathering
of scholarship from different jurisdictions, and the publication of the results, is to advance the shared enterprise of
building more just States and societies through law.

3

The Rule of Law

Proponents of constitutionalism and better constitutional
government and institutions generally assert one or the
other or both of two fundamental values as the central principle of their pursuit of justice through constitutional law.
These two basic principles—the frequently reiterated
aspirations for “liberty” and the “rule of law”—are in many
respects the same thing and have both been at the heart of the
constitutional project since the writings of Aristotle4 and
Cicero.5 In modern legal discourse they have come to represent the two main elements of well-constructed constitutions
everywhere. “The rule of law” primarily arises from the
procedural and structural elements of constitutions that seek
to control and guide the deliberation and actions of public
ofﬁcials towards their proper end of justice through checks
and balances, the separation of powers, federalism, and similar structural devices. “Liberty”, in contrast, has come to
stand for those substantive and fundamental human rights
declared and protected by the constitution, without regard to
structure or procedure. In fact, however, substantive liberty
and the procedural rule of law are fully complementary and
neither is possible without the other.
The rule of law bears further scrutiny because it is so often
appropriated by autocrats or traduced by self-interested misconstruction. The “rule of law” should not be confused with
“rule by law,” to implement the will of corrupt factions and
self-interested despots. The “rule of law” in its most useful
sense is “the rule of law and not of men” (“imperium legum”)
promoted by republican Rome and the eighteenth-century
Enlightenment that inaugurated the modern science of constitutional law.6 The rule of law in this sense demands that the
laws should rule and not the will or desires of powerful public
ofﬁcials. There is no rule of law when power can achieve its
private aims through misappropriation of the public legal
apparatus. The rule of law demands that ofﬁcers of the state
should themselves be constrained by law and prevented from
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arbitrary action. Students of constitutional science since
Machiavelli and Adams have sought to discover “what combination of powers in society, or what form of government,
will compel the formation of good and equal laws, an impartial execution, and faithful interpretation of them, so that
citizens may constantly enjoy the beneﬁt of them, and be
sure of their continuance.”7
The rule of law in this sense requires the absence of
arbitrary government, which is to say, the prevention of any
exercise of governmental power that departs from
government’s only legitimate purpose, which is service to
the welfare of all those subject to its rule. Many governments
depart from this standard. Many constitutions, much constitutional change, and numerous constitutional amendments
violate the rule of law by facilitating oppression, corruption,
and the deliberate betrayal of justice and the public good by
those who ought to keep them safe. But since doing so
violates the justifying purpose of constitutional government,
any governments that do so diminish their own legitimacy,
and lay themselves open to criticism. Knowing this, corrupt
and self-interested rulers dissimulate their actual purposes.
All constitutions, all constitutional change, and all constitutional amendments claim to serve justice, even when they do
not do so in fact.

4

Liberty in its most basic sense is equal citizenship in a just
community. To live under a just constitution is to enjoy
liberty, and vice versa. In this sense liberty and the rule of
law go hand in hand. Where there is the rule of law there is
liberty, and otherwise not.8 But liberty has a second, more
speciﬁc connotation, as the enjoyment of fundamental
“liberties,” or human rights. Some rights are so basic that
there is no justice without them, and therefore no liberty until
they are restored. This substantive liberty supplements the
procedural liberty associated with the rule of law. Good
constitutions address both requirements: ﬁrst, the procedural
checks and balances that prevent arbitrary government; and
second, the substantive protections that declare and protect
fundamental human rights.9
The substantive liberty of fundamental human rights, like
the procedural liberty of the rule of law, may differ in its
requirements depending on the circumstances. Constitutionalism everywhere shares (or claims to share) the same basic
goals of justice and the common good, but societies differ in
their development, education, needs, and circumstances. The
project of constitutional change is not and should not be

4

7

5

8

Especially Aristoteles, Politika.
Especially M. Tullius Cicero, de republica, de legibus, de ofﬁciis.
6
Silkenat et al. (2014) and Sellers and Tomaszewski (2010).

Liberty

Adams (1787).
Titus Livius. 2.1.
9
See e.g. Reidy and Sellers (2005).
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simply to discover the best institutions of the most free
societies and to implement them everywhere, but rather to
move each State forward towards greater liberty and justice,
as circumstances require or permit.
Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu all
engaged in the science of constitutionalism, seeking to
make forms of government better and more just. But the
real birth of deliberate constitutional amendment and constitutional change came only with the republican revolutions of
the late eighteenth century, through their declared commitment to liberty and the fundamental rights of all human
beings, everywhere. Constitutions became written
documents, expressly dedicated to liberty and justice, with
speciﬁc procedures for amendment, and carefully drafted
bills of rights. This is the project of constitutionalism, in
which all governments should be engaged, and to which the
contributors to this volume have dedicated their careers.10

amendment or constitutional change share the same underlying putative purpose and two fundamental underlying
principles. Whether we seek to change the written constitution, the interpretation of the constitution, the culture of
constitutional legality, or the effectiveness of its operation,
we claim to do so in pursuit of justice. We claim to amend
constitutions in order to secure just laws, to maintain just
institutions, to interpret the laws justly, or to develop a culture
that supports justice and a just society for all. We claim this—
with varying degrees of sincerity—because to admit otherwise would vitiate the enterprise.

6

Constitutional Duties

The project of constitutionalism is also the purpose of constitutional amendment, which moves the constitution forward
towards greater effectiveness and justice. In the new world of
written constitutions, we generally think of constitutional
change as taking place in or through four broad forms or
techniques: formal constitutional amendment; informal constitutional amendment; customary constitutional amendment;
and illegal constitutional amendment. All four of these
techniques have the effect of implementing constitutional
change. All four techniques have the same declared purpose
of creating a more just society. And all four can be legitimate
or illegitimate or justiﬁed or unjustiﬁed, depending on the
circumstances in which they take place.
Formal constitutional amendment takes place with the
introduction of written changes into the text of the constitution itself. Informal constitutional amendment is also a deliberate change, not to the written text, but to the interpretation
or application of the written constitution in practice. Customary constitutional amendment is the non-deliberate alteration
of the constitution through the evolution of the culture and
understanding of the constitution and constitutional interpretation. Illegal constitutional amendment is the deliberate disregard of the constitution and its requirements, sometimes
behind the veil or some scant pretense of interpretation, by
simply violating the constitution’s actual provisions, and
doing something contrary to what the constitution would
have required, if understood sincerely.11
Notwithstanding their starkly contrasting modes of operation, all four of these well-known methods of constitutional

The duties of those who interpret, explain, enforce, study,
teach, and amend the constitution arise directly from the
constitution’s only proper purpose and justiﬁcation, which
is justice. This means that the nature of the constitution and
the nature of constitutional interpretation should vary
according to the social and historical realities of the societies
and institutions in which the proposed constitutional change
takes place. The constitutional changes or amendments that
will be appropriate at different times and in different places
will depend on the nature of the existing constitution, the
nature of the society it governs, and the circumstances in
which it operates.
Suppose that a constitution is substantially just, in the
sense that it establishes institutions that facilitate worthwhile
and fulﬁlling lives for all those subject to its rule. If the
governing institutions are just, then we share in a duty to
protect and defend them. But when the existing constitution
has established or maintains an unjust society we have a duty
to establish more just institutions, ideally by formal constitutional amendment. So, for example, after ﬁghting a Civil War
over the institution of slavery, the United States amended its
constitution to abolish slavery, and establish the principle that
all persons should enjoy due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws. This was an improvement, which
made the constitution better.12
Had there been no formal amendment, however, as before
the War, when the text of the constitution seemed to require
the return to slavery of those who managed to escape, then
conscientious judges should have interpreted the Constitution to make it more just. Good judges would have done so in
the face of a difﬁcult text and perhaps even in violation of the
text, because slavery is such a fundamental injustice that it
requires amendment. Teachers of constitutional law,
professors and other commentators and publicists, should
have guided the constitutional culture in such a way as to

10

12

5

11

Amendment

Cf. Sellers (2003).
Cf. Roznai (2017).

See, Constitution of the United States Amendment XIII (December
6, 1865) and Amendment XIV (July 9, 1869).
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protect the fugitive slaves, because slavery is so clearly
antithetical to justice.13

but they often do so over time, with considerable opposition
and delay.

7

8

Constitutional Justice

The example of the great injustice of slavery in the United
States before the Civil War, and the further injustice of racial
discrimination and racial oppression afterwards, illustrate the
methods and necessity of constitutional change, and the
inescapable standard of justice against which to measure
every aspect of the constitutional project. Similar, if perhaps
smaller, injustices exist in every political community, and
need to be rectiﬁed. Formal and informal constitutional
amendments and constitutional changes always take place
in the light of justice and have no use or justiﬁcation unless
they take justice into account. At the same time, justice is
impossible without constitutionalism. Constitutional obscurity conceals and facilitates injustice, and only the clearsighted examination and open discussion of scientiﬁc constitutionalism can overcome the concealed manipulations of
unjustiﬁed authority.
Constitutional justice is the only legitimate aim of constitutional amendment, and should give continuous guidance to
all students of constitutional law. Constitutions play not only
a procedural and substantive role in the search for the common good and the protection of fundamental liberties, but
also an educative role in improving the civic and constitutional cultures of the societies they regulate and protect.
Simply by declaring fundamental rights, constitutions make
these rights more real. By announcing commitments to justice, liberty, and the common good, constitutions make
citizens and public ofﬁcials more likely to respect their
duties. Not that we will always fulﬁll all the constitutional
duties that we know to exist, but knowledge of justice is the
ﬁrst step towards respect for justice, and its eventual realization. Even hypocrisy is better than ignorance.
Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue,14 which is
why even the worst regimes declare noble constitutional
aims. They do this to claim a legitimacy they do not deserve.
Yet even hypocritical declarations of rights and duties have
the virtue of reminding us that such constitutional rights and
duties exist, and noble sentiments once embedded in
constitutions may bloom years later to move the law towards
greater justice. This gives formal constitutional amendment a
value that transcends its actual effectiveness. Formal, informal, cultural, and even illegal constitutional change are useful and justiﬁed only when they make the world more just,

Argentina

Actual constitutions and experiences of constitutional
amendment in various nations illustrate both the general
principles and some differing realities of constitutional
change. For example, the Argentine Constitution
contemplates a very formal process of constitutional amendment, beginning with a special act of Congress summoning a
constitutional convention. Nevertheless, a constitutional
amendment of 1994 made it possible for treaties to achieve
constitutional status, bypassing the need for a constitutional
convention. This facilitated Argentina’s conformation to
global standards of justice, without facing the procedural
limitations of ordinary constitutional politics. The 1994
amendment itself respected formal procedures, so constitutional propriety was maintained, but it changed the nature of
the Constitution, making formal constitutional change much
easier than it had been before.
The stricter the formal process of amendment, as in
Argentina, the more likely there will be informal
“amendments” made to the constitutional regime through
judicial interpretation. Estela Sacristan, in report on constitutional amendment in Argentina, notes many emergency
measures eroding property rights that were tolerated by the
Argentine Supreme Court under the guise of “regulation.” A
series of cases beginning with a decision concerning rent
control in Ercolano c/ Lanteri de Renshaw showed great
caution in protecting property rights. The court’s motivation
reﬂected crisis conditions and economic necessity in the
wake of the First World War, but the rationale offered by
the Court to justify such decisions relied on the pretense that
such regulations were “temporary.” This was disingenuous,
but effective.
The Argentine example illustrates the symbiotic relationship between formal and informal constitutional change. The
great difﬁculty of achieving formal amendment in Argentina
encouraged
informal
amendment
through
the
non-enforcement of formal constitutional requirements.
This was particularly striking in the case of the right to a
jury trial, formally incorporated into the Constitution of
1853–1860 in Section 24. This right has never been fully
implemented by law and remains a nullity in practice.

9

Australia

13

See e.g. Dyer (2012).
François, Duc de la Rochefoucauld, Réﬂections: ou sentences et
maximes morales (1664) #218: “L’hypocrisie est un homage que le
vice rend à la vertu.”
14

Australia’s written Constitution was passed as a statute by the
Imperial Parliament in the United Kingdom in 1900.
Australians were consulted, but as a formal matter the

498

M. N. S. Sellers

constitution was imposed by the imperial power. To make
formal changes in the constitution, the Australian Parliament
must propose changes for approval by a majority of electors
in a majority of the Australian States (and a majority of
electors overall). As in Argentina, this difﬁcult process has
made formal amendments rare, and encouraged informal
constitutional changes, mostly through judicial interpretation. The High Court of Australia is the ultimate arbiter of
constitutional meaning in Australia, and has not been shy in
exercising its power.
The British background of the Australian constitutional
tradition left most human and civil rights with very little
formal constitutional protection, but the High Court has
stepped in to remedy the deﬁciency by construction. The
Court has found the implication of freedom of political communication (for example) in the necessities of representative
democracy, as established by the Constitution as a whole.
Elisa Arcioni observes in her report on constitutional amendment in Australia that Commonwealth and State legislation
can and has been struck down as invalid when it conﬂicts
with fundamental human rights, including the right to political participation, or any of the other rights necessary for
political participation to be effective, and well-informed.
The dubious legitimacy of an Australian constitution
imposed by the ﬁat of a foreign parliament, and with very
few embedded substantive and procedural rights, has therefore been much enhanced by an Australian judicial culture
that values democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental
human rights. The ostensibly Federal nature of the
Australian constitution has similarly given way in the face
of the needs of the Commonwealth as a whole. The formal
text of the Australian constitution today is almost unchanged
since its enactment in 1900, yet it governs a democratic and
substantially just legal system, with the widespread support
of all elements of Australian society.

constitutional change that nevertheless has a profound effect
on the actual system of government in Belgium.
Jurgen Goosens, in his report on constitutional amendment and constitutional change in Belgium, explains the
highly complicated nature of Belgian federalism, which
divides Belgium not only into linguistic communities, but
also into geographic regions. This deliberate structure of
checks and balances assures that nothing substantial can be
accomplished without broad communal as well as regional
consensus. Consensus in reality depends upon the secret
negotiations of party leaders and high public ofﬁcials, with
no input from the people and very little from Parliament or
any other organs of the State. This small elite often succeeds
in effective compromise, which the rest of society accepts,
but the process can be difﬁcult. In 2010 and 2011 it took
Belgian politicians 541 days to agree on a new state reform
and to form a new government. Thus, constitutional reform
and ordinary politics were unavoidably linked.
In fact, the constitutional amendment or “Sixth State
Reform” implementing the compromise of 2011 by substantially altering the structure of the Senate, took place outside
the existing procedures for constitutional amendment, adding
(and then relying upon) a new “transitional provision” in the
clause regulating constitutional change. This sleight-of-hand
made compromise possible, and received the imprimatur of
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, but
illustrates the extent to which the legitimacy of constitutional
change in Belgium relies on the substantive necessity of
satisfying the communities, rather than the procedures
through which constitutional alterations take place. Each
change has been incremental towards greater communal federalism and it is this value, rather than formal procedures,
which has been decisive.

11
10

Belgium

The Belgian Constitution has been evolving since the 1970s
from a unitary state into a more federal form of government.
This was done through a series of six amendments
strengthening the role of linguistic groups in all aspects of
the Belgian legal system. This included the establishment of a
Belgian Constitutional Court, to review the constitutionality
of legislation and its compliance with the division of powers
between the linguistic groups. The Constitutional Court is the
ultimate arbiter of the Belgian Constitution and therefore the
primary engine of informal constitutional change in Belgium.
The Legislative Division of the Council of State also has
signiﬁcant inﬂuence, since it advises the legislators on proposed legislation. Belgian constitutional lawyers refer to this
process as “latent state reform,” unacknowledged

China

Chinese judicial culture is dramatically different from that of
Belgium. Where Belgian judges act with self-conﬁdent independence, Chinese judges demonstrate no independence at
either the formal or the practical level. The rule of law,
democracy, and fundamental human rights have no real
inﬂuence on judicial behavior in China. Thus, judges in
China have neither the constitutional power of judicial review
nor any inclination to restrain or correct the formally illegal
actions of public ofﬁcials. Since 1949, China has adopted ﬁve
different formal constitutions, none of which had made a
substantial difference on the actual behavior of public
ofﬁcials, or underlying realities of party rule in an autocratic
and undemocratic State.
The most signiﬁcant element in actual Chinese legal and
political practice since 1949 has been the policy guidelines of
the Communist party, such as the “Two Whatevers”
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guideline of the 1970s: “Whatever policy decision was made
by Chairman Mao we must resolutely maintain; whatever
instruction was made by Chairman Mao, we must
unswervingly abide by.” Chengdong Jin in his report on
constitutional change in China notes that the seventh paragraph of the Preamble on guidelines is the most frequently
amended part of the Chinese Constitution. Recent signiﬁcant
amendment made in this paragraph added “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a
New Era” to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought,
Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Thought of Three Represents
and the Scientiﬁc Outlook on Development as “Guiding
Ideologies of the State.”
Thus, although the Chinese Constitution now declares a
commitment to improve “the socialist rule of law,” it
reiterates that “the leadership of the Communist Party of
China is the most essential feature of socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” The new constitution also removes the
two-term limit that had been placed on the Chinese president,
eliminating what had been the most signiﬁcant restriction on
presidential power. Formal constitutional amendment in
China is approved by the National People’s Congress at the
proposal of the Communist Party of China, but in reality such
formal procedures simply ratify and make public decisions
already taken and implemented by the President and his
coterie. The Chinese Constitution is operative in reality
only insofar as it reveals the attitudes of those who are
actually in charge. The real constitution follows the vagaries
of the President’s will.

12

Cyprus

Cyprus is a former British colony and received its independence and constitution, like Australia, through an Act of the
British Parliament. Cyprus was unusual in being a
bi-communal State, with guarantees and protections for
both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot
communities. For this reason, 48 out of the 199 Articles of
the 1960 Constitution are basic and unamendable, whereas
non-basic articles may be amended by a law passed by
separate special majorities comprising at least two-thirds of
the Greek-Cypriot representatives and at least two-thirds of
the Turkish-Cypriot representatives. This structure sought to
maintain communal solidarity by respecting all elements of
Cypriot society.
This noble intention met practical frustration when Greek
and Turkish Cypriots failed to develop the culture of cooperation necessary to support their shared political institutions.
Greek Cypriots took charge of the government, Turkish
Cypriots withdrew their participation, and political control
and the island was divided between the two communities in a
manner wholly inconsistent with the formal constitutional
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order. The only conceivable justiﬁcation for such actions
was the doctrine of necessity. The formal constitution
became a nullity, the Turkish half of the island disregarded
the Constitution and the Greek half of the island implemented
constitutional amendments without reference to the formal
provisions of the Constitution itself. Konstantinos Kombos
and Athena Herodotou explain in their report on constitutional change in Cyprus that no other option was available,
given the irreconcilable breach between the two communities
on the island.
The Cypriot experience illustrate the complicated relationship between substantive justice, procedural justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness in constitutional amendment and
constitutional law. The structure of the formal Cypriot constitution was dictated by a political compromise between
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, never fully
accepted by the citizens of Cyprus. The substantive justice
of the compromises embodied in the document could not
overcome the mutual hostility of the Cypriots, undermining
the effectiveness of the formal document in practice. Necessity therefore required unconstitutional constitutional
amendments—amendments which could be justiﬁed, if at
all, only by their substantive justice and utility. Thus, constitutional amendment like constitution-drafting and constitutional interpretation ultimately derives its legitimacy and
validity from the substantive requirements of justice.

13

The Czech Republic

The process of formal constitutional amendment in the Czech
Republic takes place by three-ﬁfths vote of each of the two
houses of the legislature, with the restriction that “Any
changes in the essential requirements for a democratic
law-based state are impermissible.”15 The Constitution does
not specify what these are, giving considerable latitude to the
constitutional authorities and especially to the Constitutional
Court. The Constitutional Court has stated that “the guiding
principle is undoubtedly the principle of inherent inalienable,
non-prescriptable, and non-repealable fundamental rights and
freedoms of individuals equal in dignity and rights; a system
based on principles of democracy, the sovereignty of the
people, and separation of powers, respecting the cited material concept of a law-based state.”16
The relatively recent date (1993) and favorable
circumstances of the Constitution of the Czech Republic
help to explain its clear commitment to the democratic rule
of law, and the principles this entails. Miluśe Kindlová,
points out in reporting on constitutional amendment in the
15

Art. 9(2) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic.
Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 26-11-2008. File No. 19108
(No. 446/2008 Coll.) par. 93.
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Czech republic that many of its drafters and interpreters
believed such principles to be binding and unamendable in
their own right, being principles required of any legitimate
constitution, and therefore beyond the competence of any
constitution-maker to limit or diminish their peremptory
effect. This would make the principles of the democratic
rule of law unamendable limitations on constitutional amendment, even when the constitution makes no such express
prohibition in the body of its own written text.
The Czech Constitutional Court relied on Art. 9(2) of the
constitution, protecting the “democratic law-based state” to
impose a ratchet on constitutional amendment, so that “no
amendment of the Constitution may be construed in a way
which would lead to a limitation of the already attained level
of procedural protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms.”17 This extends to the delegation of powers of
the Czech Republic to the European Union, which “must
not go so far as to impair the very essence of the republic as
a sovereign and democratic state governed by the rule of law
and based on the respect for rights and freedoms of man and
citizen or establish a change in the essential requirements of
the democratic state based on the rule of law.”18

14

Denmark

Denmark’s constitutional rules are essentially entrenched in
one single act, the “Grundloven,” or “Fundamental Law,”
consisting of 89 sections. Formal amendment of the
Grundloven requires a positive vote by two consecutive
Parliaments (with an intervening election) followed by a
direct vote of the electors, and royal approval. Thus, formal
constitutional amendment requires not only concurrence of
the government and two Parliaments, but also the electorate,
requiring both a majority of those voting and positive vote by
at least 40% of the electorate as a whole. This very democratic, but also quite restrictive procedure has rendered formal constitutional amendment rather rare in Denmark.
The logic of this strict rule of formal constitutional amendment implies that treaties and the case law of bodies
established by treaties cannot be read into the rules of the
Fundamental Act. Jens Hartig Danielsen in his report on
constitutional amendment in Denmark points out the Danish
treaties only require a simple majority of votes to take effect,
a much less stringent standard than the formal procedures
required to amend the basic law. The strictness of the formal
standard encourages in Denmark the same creativity in informal procedures that arises whenever formal amendment is
17
Ruling of the Constitutional court of 25.6.2002 File No. Pl. US 36/01
(No. 403/2022 Coll.).
18
Ruling of the Constitutional Court of 26.11.2008 File No. 19/08
(No. 446/2008 Coll.), par. 93.

hard to achieve. In this case, Denmark has developed certain
“constitutional customs” that modify the Grundloven. For
example, the Parliament’s Finance Committee is entitled to
authorize ministers to incur expenses, in clear contravention
of Section 46(2) of the Fundamental Act.
The Danish Constitution illustrates the ﬂexibility possible
in a very small and culturally homogenous nation, with a high
level of education and general consensus in favor of the rule
of law, social solidarity, and fundamental human rights.
Somewhat archaic and under-elaborated constitutional
structures operate well through the good will of governments,
legislators, and other public ofﬁcials. Formal constitutional
change takes place only with very broad social support and
generally ratiﬁes informal changes that have already occurred
in the society at large. Formal constitutional details become
less important when the society itself is operating well.

15

Hungary

Hungary illustrates the threats to constitutional government
that arise when the government itself sets out to undermine
the rule of law. Formal amendment has been comparatively
easy in Hungary since the 1949 Soviet era constitution, which
established amendment by two-thirds majority in Parliament.
This became signiﬁcant in 1989, when the Hungarian Republic used formal constitutional amendment to establish a democratic rule of law state. After 2010, with the rise of illiberal
and authoritarian parties in Hungary, these same procedures
made it easier to constitutionalize provisions that violated the
liberal rule of law reforms of 1989.
The possibility that the Hungarian Constitutional Court
might review illiberal or anti-democratic constitutional
amendments for their compatibility with the fundamental
principles of the Constitution as a whole was directly
attacked by a formal amendment in 2013, which stated that
“[t]he Constitutional Court may only review the Fundamental
Law and amendment thereof for conformity with the procedural requirements laid down in the Fundamental Law with
respect to its adoption and promulgation.”19 Tímea Drinóczi,
Fruszina Gárdos-Orosz, and Zoltan Pozsár-Szentmiklósy, in
their Hungarian Report point out that vague constitutional
provisions concerning fundamental rights invite broad judicial discretion, verging on informal constitutional amendment, that may be challenged by political actors, when they
believe that judges have gone too far.
When the strength of the governing party in Parliament
exceeds two-thirds, as has been the case in Hungary for much
of the past decade, the government may be tempted to amend
the constitution whenever constitutional protections thwart
19

Article 24(5) of the Fundamental Law adopted by the Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental law in 2013.
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the government’s will. The Constitutional Court of Hungary
afﬁrmed in response that the jus cogens of international law
and common principles of the constitutional heritage limit the
powers of the constituent power, even when this follows the
Constitution’s formal procedures.20 Therefore, although the
Fundamental Law does not contain unamendable clauses and
the Fundamental Law limits the right of the Constitutional
Court to review the amendment of the Constitution, the
Constitutional Court, by way of interpretation, discovered
its inherent power to make substantive review of
amendments to the Fundamental Law in certain cases.
Whether in practice this will restrain the government in any
way, remains to be determined.
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secular nature of the State, and an “undeniable core” of
fundamental rights connected to human dignity, despite the
absence of any express reference to such matters in the
Constitutional text. Many of these developments correspond
to broader trends in the European culture of constitutional
law, sometimes justiﬁed by reference to the “open clause’ of
article 11, which allows the ratiﬁcation of European Treaties
through ordinary legislation, without the need to modify the
text of the Italian Constitution.21 At the same time, the Court
has identiﬁed in the “supreme principles of the constitutional
system” a limit to the primacy of European law.22 Due to the
lack of consensus and the difﬁculty of amendment, most of
the constitutional change since the Second World War in
Italy has been informal, made by courts and governments in
response to the exigencies of the moment.

Italy

The Italian constitution of 1948 was implemented after a
period of fascist rule under a ﬂexible and easily amended
constitution, leading to many of the same abuses currently
evident in Hungary. The post-war Constitution therefore
made amendment more difﬁcult in order to entrench fundamental constitutional values against transient majorities. The
new rules required the concurrence of both legislative houses
for amendment in two successive debates, and approval by
popular referendum (Article 138)—unless both chambers
achieve a 2/3 majority at their second reading. The Constitution also stipulated that, “the republican form of the State shall
not be a matter for constitutional amendment” (Art. 139).
Recent constitutional amendments have limited the death
penalty (Art. 27), regulated the vote of Italian citizens living
abroad (Art. 48), strengthened the equal opportunities of men
and woman (Art. 51) and brought Italy into closer conformity
with the institutions of the European Union (Art. 111). Tania
Groppi, in her report on constitutional amendment in Italy,
observes that the formal amendment procedures set out in
Article 138 of the Italian Constitution have implemented
reforms very effectively when the political will is present,
even in times of considerable opposition and controversy.
There have also been many informal amendments, made
possible by the generality of most constitutional
prescriptions. Electoral Laws or Standing Orders of the
Chambers ﬁll in and clarify when the Constitution is vague.
The broad capacity of Electoral Laws allow broad changes in
the form of government to take place without formal constitutional amendment.
The Constitutional Court of Italy has used constitutional
interpretation to protect universal human rights not expressly
mentioned in the constitutional text. The Court has also
discovered unstated constitutional principles, such as the

17

The Constitution of Japan was issued on November 3, 1946,
shortly after the end of the Second World War, and came into
effect on May 3 of the following year. This made it the basis
of the post-war settlement, introducing a rigidity even greater
than that of Italy, which came into existence in similar
circumstances. There has never been a formal amendment
of the Japanese Constitution. This makes informal constitutional changes more signiﬁcant made mainly through a strategy known as “Kaishaku Kaiken,” accomplishing de facto
constitutional change by reinterpreting the constitution. The
foreign origin and rigidity of their constitution has led many
Japanese to view the existing form of government as an alien
imposition, and politicians frequently call for more formal
amendments, particularly in Article 9, which strictly limits
Japan’s recourse to military power.
The Japanese experience raises fundamental questions
about constitutional legitimacy. Does legitimacy depend on
the excellence of the constitution or the procedure which
created it? Japan’s constitution as it exists today substantially
incorporates a draft constitution prepared by the General
Headquarters of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan after the Second
World War. This implemented democracy and respect for
human rights, fundamentally replacing the autocratic
institutions of the Meiji imperial regime. Keigo Komamura
explains in reporting on constitutional amendment in Japan
that some view this American constitution as having
inaugurated an “August Revolution,” bringing new authority
and self-rule to the Japanese people, while reducing the
emperor to a ceremonial role. Others object to what they
21
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Decision 12/2013 (V.24) of the Constitutional Court, Reasoning, [30],
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Since Decision No. 14/1964.
Since Decision No. 183/1973, and especially in Decision
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characterize as an “imposed constitution,” importing Western
values to Japan.
The formal procedures of constitutional amendment in
Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution require two-thirds
majorities in both houses of the Nation Diet, followed by a
majority of votes in a subsequent national referendum. When
a constitutional amendment is approved in accordance with
these procedures, the Emperor immediately announces its
ofﬁcial promulgation in the name of the people. This procedure combines popular sovereignty with the authority of the
Emperor as the basis of constitutional change, but does not
entirely avoid the underlying reality that the Constitution
itself arose by imposition, after military defeat. The Constitution of Japan begins in its Preamble declaring constitutional
democracy, liberty, and the abhorrence of war as “universal
principles of humanity,” and it is on these principles, rather
than popular sovereignty, that the legitimacy of the Japanese
Constitution must ultimately rest.

18

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, as in all the nations reporting on their
constitutions at the World Congress of Comparative Law in
Fukuoka, informal constitutional change has taken place
much more frequently than formal amendment. That should
not be surprising given the deliberately general and open
texture of most well-drafted constitutions, and the unavoidable alterations required by changing circumstances in
evolving societies. The current Constitution of the
Netherlands ﬁrst came into existence in 1814, and therefore
represents one of the world’s most stable constitutional
polities. This happened in part with the aid of gradual constitutional change, both formal and informal, over many years.
Reijer Passchier in his report on the Constitution of the
Netherlands stresses that informal processes of constitutional
change have been much more important than formal constitutional revision and that therefore informal change should be
the central concern of anyone who seeks to understand Dutch
constitutional development. This arises in part from the relative difﬁculty of formal constitutional changes in the
Netherlands, which requires two legislative stages, with general elections for the lower house in between. The ﬁrst
reading requires a simple majority of both houses of parliament. The second reading requires a qualiﬁed two-thirds
majority in both houses and the assent of the government.
This does not frequently occur.
Passchier advocates what he calls an “historicalinstitutionalist” view of constitutional change, accepting the
authority of formal constitutional norms, while recognizing
that institutional practices and understandings of these norms
may evolve over time. Thus, the master constitutional text
retains its authority, but the institutional context in which the
constitution is embedded can adjust to changing

circumstances. This can lead to reinterpretation or to the
development of new conventions to govern the application
of constitutional principles in practice. The text does not
change, but its meaning changes, or actors come to feel
bound by standards that are not explicit in the text.

19

Poland

Poland offers another example of a constitutional state in
which the rule of the law and the stability of constitutional
rights has been challenged by the forces of populism. Poland
has relatively rigid formal procedures of constitutional
amendment, designed to protect the rights of the people and
the humanistic orientation of the state. The introduction to the
Constitution of Poland refers to the “inherent dignity of the
person, his or her right to freedom, the obligation of solidarity
with others, and respect for these principles as the
unshakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland.”
Janusz Trzinski and Michal Szwast in their report on the
Constitution of Poland identify the development of a new
mechanism of extra-constitutional change of the constitutional order. Thwarted by courts and other institutions in
the pursuit of unconstitutional political aims, but without
sufﬁcient numbers to effectuate formal amendment, the dominant party in the legislature has used ordinary legislation to
alter the laws governing the operation of key state bodies, in
order to render them ineffectual in fulﬁlling their duty of
protecting constitutional norms. For example, numerous
amendments of the Constitutional Tribunal Act have made
it impossible for the Court to function or to exercise its
powers normally, and prevented the review of unconstitutional legislation.
Such interventions by the legislature may be seen as
simple violations of the rule of law, contrary to formal constitutional norms. The innovation of the Polish technique
arises from its oblique effect. By incapacitating public
authorities, legislation on capacity and procedure renders
the formal constitution inoperative, and substitutes a new
legislative constitution, superseding the formal institutions
of the state. This challenge to the rule of law is more subtle
than the open subversion of the rule of law in Hungary, or the
constitutionally entrenched extra-legal role of the party in
China, but it has a similar effect. By removing the possibility
of constitutional review and enforcement, the government
renders the existing constitution inoperable and opens the
door to less restrictive informal constitutional norms.

20

Romania

The 1989 Constitution of Romania has a comparatively rigid
structure of formal constitutional amendment, requiring
two-thirds majorities in both houses of parliament, followed
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by a referendum. There is also a secure and assertive Constitutional Court. Thus, most constitutional change has been
informal and has taken place with the acceptance of even at
the initiative of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional
Court is also the ﬁrst and last authority to give an opinion on
formal constitutional changes. This power, conveyed in
Article 146 of the Constitution, provides that the popular
referendum required for constitutional amendment may not
take place until the Court has given its approval.
Elena-Simina Tӑnӑsescu and Bianca Selejan-Guţan in
their report on constitutional amendment in Romania note
that the most striking examples of informal constitutional
revision by the Romanian Constitutional Court have been
the Court’s efforts to constitutionalise its own new
competences, introduced by law. The powers in question
were introduced by the organic law of the Court in 2010
concerning review of Acts of Parliament. In a decision
made in 2012, the court concluded that Parliament’s legislative power concerning the Court’s powers only extended to
increasing the Court’s powers but not to removing powers
already conferred by law. These now had a “constitutional
rank,” despite the silence of the constitution on such matters.
The experience of Romania illustrates the general proposition that the mere existence of a Constitutional Court does
not guarantee protection against unconstitutional revisions.
Most informal revisions of the Romanian constitution have
taken place with the blessing of the Constitutional Court. In
addition to the question of extending its own jurisdiction, the
Court has been remarkably complacent in the face of legislative incursions against fundamental rights, such as the legislative ban on same-sex marriage, and popular initiatives to
entrench the marriage ban in the Constitution. These may to
some extent reﬂect a desire to avoid defying public opinion in
emotive cases, even to protect fundamental human rights.

21

Singapore

Singapore has been ruled by one party with an overwhelming
majority in Parliament since its independence in 1965. This
majority has never fallen below the two-thirds threshold
required for constitutional amendment, making the Constitution, for the most part, an instrument, rather than a limitation,
on the ruling party. The primary aim and main source of
legitimacy of the Singapore government since its inception
has been economic growth, not democratic or constitutional
guarantees, and the government has altered the constitution
whenever the court has exhibited a desire to constrain it, as in
the Chng Suan Tze decision in 1989, concerning the detention of suspected dissidents.
Constitutional change in Singapore has generally been
formal, in light of the dominance of a single political party.
Swati Jhaveri in her report on the Constitution of Singapore
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observes that this has given rise to an instrumental rather than
a normative view of the Constitution and constitutional
amendment, as a tool for political consolidation and change,
rather than a limit on government power. The aim has been to
achieve a sense of stability in politics, which is heavily
managed, rather than seeking to protect fundamental rights,
or limit the powers of the government. The executive power
in Singapore has guided the process from the beginning, and
never shared its primacy with other organs of the State.
This executive-led process prevented the constitution
itself from playing a signiﬁcant role in conferring legitimacy
on government. De facto change in the actual constitution of
Singapore always precedes alterations in the de jure constitution, which simply reﬂects political realities that develop
outside the formal constitutional framework. Singapore’s
relative stability and ﬁnancial success under the more-orless untrammeled rule of a single powerful man and his
family has avoided too much scrutiny of the largely irrelevant
formal constitution. This well illustrates Pope’s dictum that
good administration can overcome poor forms of government, more often than good constitutional structures can
overcome the corruption of rulers or—what is worse—the
corruption of the people themselves.23

22

Slovak Republic

The Slovak Constitution shares with many other constitutions
and particularly with post-Soviet and post-imperial
constitutions, the imbedded desire to overcome and prevent
the worst offenses of a preceding regime. More speciﬁcally,
the Constitution seeks self-consciously to entrench and perpetuate fundamental liberal values, including universal
human rights, the rule of law, and democratic participation
of citizens in their national government and politics. At the
same time, the National Council of the Slovak Republic (the
parliament) has the power to approve the Constitution and
constitutional laws, as well as their amendment. The task of
the constitution and the Constitutional Court is to reconcile
this constituent power of the National Council with the values
and purposes it exists to serve.
Ján Svák and Boris Balog observe in their report on the
Slovak Republic that when the current Constitution was
adopted by the Slovak National Council in 1992, the measure
was not formally described as a constitutional law. Nevertheless, it has been universally accepted as such. Moreover,
although the constitution contains no explicit derogatory
clause, the National Council of the Slovak Republic has
approved constitutional amendments since 1998, in the
23
“For forms of government let fools contest. Whate’er is best
administer’d is best” Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle
3.1.303-4 (1733).
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form of constitutional laws—or “amending constitutional
laws”—when they directly amend the Constitution. None of
this is formally contemplated by the constitutional text, but it
ﬁts the over-all scheme well, reﬂects Slovak constitutional
tradition, and is necessary for the smooth execution of the
constitutional structure as a whole.
This relationship between formal and informal constitutional institutions reﬂects the importance of underlying constitutional values in any successful constitutional regime, and
the necessary constitutional principles that support these
values and give the constitution the coherence and legitimacy
that make it effective in practice. Fundamental constitutional
values may be explicit or merely implied in the constitutional
text, but they animate the whole and constitute the ultimate
constitution of the state. To disregard or change these underlying values and principles to overturn the Constitution in
toto. The Slovak Constitutional Court has been quite deferential in policing these boundaries, which has weakened the
liberal and democratic vitality of the State.

23

Switzerland

Switzerland is, with the Netherlands and the United States,
one of the world’s oldest federal, liberal, and democratic
republics, and provided an inspiration for the development
of more scientiﬁc constitutional government throughout the
world. Paradoxically, the very antiquity and self-conﬁdence
of these ancient republics also makes their written
constitutions more quirky and antiquated than more recently
drafted forms of government. But their supporting constitutional culture is correspondingly deeper, and therefore more
able to transcend any weaknesses and infelicities in the
formal constitutional order.
Luc Gonin, in his report on constitutional amendment in
Switzerland, points out that Switzerland’s constitution
provides two primary routes towards formal constitutional
revision, through popular initiative or representative democracy. Popular initiatives have always played a large part in all
aspects of Swiss political life, and in this case require
100,000 signatures within 18 months to raise a question for
approval by the people and Cantons of Switzerland. The two
Councils and the Federal Assembly may also propose
revisions (Art. 193§1) or decree them in the case of partial
revisions by the Federal Assembly (Art. 194§1). The requirement of majority approval both by a majority of the people
and by a majority of the Cantons combines the democratic
and the federal principles, without erecting too signiﬁcant a
barrier to constitutional change.
Switzerland’s ancient and very democratic constitutional
order also illustrates the growing power of international law
and international institutions in constitutional law and constitutional interpretation. Art. 190 of the Constitution of

Switzerland explicitly requires the Federal Court to apply
national laws and international treaties without review, but
does not specify which should prevail in case of a conﬂict
between the two. The Court now ﬁrmly asserts the primacy of
international law over federal laws.24 The same applies to the
Constitution. The Supreme Court’s role in reconciling
national law with international law may constitute a form of
informal amendment, particularly where international and
constitutional context is used to redeﬁne the constitutional
norm.25

24

United States of America

The United States Constitution became effective in 1789,
opening the modern era of written constitutions and setting
a very high bar for formal amendment: two-thirds vote in
both houses of the legislature, followed by a three-quarters
vote of the States.26 This corresponds closely to the standard
set for ratiﬁcation of the original Constitution, and pays due
respect both to Federal and to State power, but is a very strict
standard making formal amendment an exceptionally rare
occurrence in the history of the United States. As in the
approval of the original federal constitution of 1787, there
is no recourse to a referendum or plebiscite, procedures
strongly disapproved by the founders of the American
republic.
Richard Kay, in his report on formal and informal amendment in the Constitution of the United States, observes that
the very difﬁcult procedure for amendment of the United
States Constitution has been offset by the broad and general
terms of the document itself. The Fourteenth Amendment in
particular, passed after the American Civil War in the
mid-nineteenth century, provides that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws” and that Congress shall have the
power to enforce this article “by appropriate legislation.”
This very broad standard establishes basic constitutional
values and principles, with an exceptionally wide range of
possible legislative and judicial applications.
Very signiﬁcantly, at the outset of constitutional government in the United States, Chief Justice John Marshall noted
on behalf of the Supreme Court in the famous case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that “it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”
24
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See, Decision 142 II 35, dated November 26, 2015, in which the
Supreme Court clariﬁed how it would resolve a normative conﬂict
between national and international law.
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Constitution of the United States, Article V.
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This established the principle of judicial review by which
American courts and particularly the United States Supreme
Court must disallow laws repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States. This decision and its understanding of the
Constitution identiﬁes a formal and deﬁnitive authority for
certifying “informal” constitutional changes, giving them a
formal warrant in the Constitution itself, without requiring
any modiﬁcation of the text, Such changes present themselves as no more than a better understanding of the existing
document, superseding erroneous readings of the past. Quite
often this assertion is actually true—or at least accepted as
true by the government and people of the United States of
America.

25

Challenges

Accounts of constitutional amendment and constitutional
change gathered from many different nations as they exist
today remind us that we live at a moment of constitutional
peril. The general trend of constitutional government in many
states for the past decade has been away from constitutional
justice, liberty, and the rule of law towards greater oppression, corruption, violence, and arbitrary action. Russia, Turkey, China, Egypt, Hungary, Poland, the United Kingdom
and the United States are among the most celebrated
examples of nations that beginning from completely different
histories and stages of constitutional development have all in
recent years seen a steep degradation of their constitutional
cultures.
Lawyers and scholars everywhere have considered
whether some speciﬁc constitutional inﬁrmity has
contributed to this decline, and which amendments or other
constitutional changes might do the most to protect liberty
and justice against the inroads of corruption and creeping
autocracy. The fault, however, seems to lie less in the
structures of the constitutions themselves than in changes of
public culture, education, and the formation of public opinion. Television, the internet, and the dissemination of information on-line make public opinion highly manipulable by
self-interested governments, oligarchs, and wealthy
corporations, to the detriment of the public good. This
undermines the democratic elements of modern constitutional governance.
The absence of an obvious formal or structural remedy to
the decline of constitutional democracy in the early twentyﬁrst century reminds us of the important role that informal
and cultural constitutional change have always played in the
development of constitutional justice. If the origin of all law
and justice is, as Cicero long ago observed, the love and care
we owe our fellow human beings, then the purity of this
source of law and justice depends on good faith, the bona
ﬁdes that we owe to the republic in fulﬁlling our civic and
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constitutional duties. While constitutions can declare the
importance of liberty, justice, and good faith, they cannot
instill these virtues directly in the people. To do so is the duty
of real human beings—and above all the scholars and
practitioners of constitutional law, who teach the public
how to understand and venerate their constitutions,
governments, and duties to each other, and to the laws.

26

Principles and Techniques

Giuseppe Franco Ferrari has usefully observed that constitutionalism as we know it is the product of the liberal tradition,
establishing the government of laws, founded on the consent
of the people, through such basic principles as the protection
of the rights of man and citizen, the separation of powers, the
rule of law, and the constitutional review of statutes codiﬁed
in a higher law. These fundamental constitutional principles
and techniques are necessary and fundamental because government without them is invariably unjust and therefore at
odds with the ﬁrst purpose of the constitutional project.
Constitutionalism begins by establishing provisions binding both on citizens and on public authorities. Constitutions
establish the aims of the State and the principles and
techniques necessary to accomplish these aims. Formally
conﬁrming this social framework in written form gives the
political community the basis to advance the public good.
The beneﬁts conveyed by deliberately designed and written
constitutions are considerable, but this raises the problem of
formal and informal amendment. Societies and nations cannot and should not be static in all aspects of their fundamental
laws and institutions. They should aspire to improve, and
most in any case respond to changing circumstances and
ideas. Amendment is therefore a necessary and inevitable
aspect of every constitution whether this is openly acknowledged or not.
The principles and techniques of constitutional government are two aspects of the same project. Constitutional
principles declare the aims, values, and core ideology that
the constitution seeks to serve. Constitutional techniques
establish social and political structures that can accomplish
and advance these aims. Both are necessary. Neither can be
effective without the other. Constitutional principles maintain
the purposive element in the enterprise. Constitutional
techniques guide deliberation and establish the institutions
that implement the policies of the State. The applicable
principles and techniques are embodied in the Constitution
itself, but must also reﬂect the inherent requirements of the
constitutional project. Many constitutional principles and
constitutional techniques are shared by all well-ordered
constitutions, regulating the resort to constitutional
change—by formal, informal, customary, or even by unconstitutional amendment, when circumstances require it.
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Conclusion

Reports from constitutional law scholars gathered from many
jurisdictions throughout the world remind us that constitutional amendment and constitutional change take place in
many ways. These can be formal, informal, cultural, and
even at times illegal, in violation of the established constitution itself. The unifying force in all such forms of constitutional change or amendment is their claim to advance justice.
No constitutional amendment or constitutional change takes
place without its proponents claiming that the change will
advance justice. They do so because constitutional amendment is not legitimate or justiﬁed unless it makes the constitution better, and the sole standard of constitutional value is
the constitution’s effectiveness in realizing justice in fact.
Constitutionalism is the project of creating or improving
the constitutions of the world so that they serve their declared
purpose better. Constitutional amendment and constitutional
change are the processes by which constitutionalists attempt
to do so in practice. The ﬁrst commitment of constitutionalism is to establish the rule of law, minimizing the arbitrary
power of public ofﬁcials, to guide them towards the public
good. Citizens protected in this way enjoy “liberty”, which is
to say protection against the domination or arbitrary power of
those who would oppress them. The procedural checks and
balances of constitutions everywhere exist to restrain arbitrary power in all forms of public and private authority.
The constitutional search for greater justice is the
animating principle that guides or should guide constitutional
amendment and constitutional change whenever and wherever it occurs. We all share a primary duty to implement,
interpret, enforce, and amend our constitutions in the light of

justice, liberty, and the rule of law, whatever our other
afﬁnities may be. The fundamental principles of justice,
once expressed, are hard to forget. Plant the seeds of justice
in the constitution if you can, or in the legal or national
culture, and eventually they will grow. Seek to establish
justice, which is the purpose of constitutional law, or at
least amend and interpret the constitution in the direction of
greater justice, whenever you can. Scholars of law in every
jurisdiction share or should share these same noble purposes.
Ita ius esto.
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